U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s February 9–10, 2026 trip to Yerevan marked a first in modern U.S.–Armenia relations: by multiple outlets’ reporting and by Armenia’s own official messaging, he is the first sitting U.S. vice president to visit Armenia. That “first-ever” framing matters, because the visit was not treated as ceremonial; it was structured around deliverables tied to Armenia’s post-2023 security recalibration, the U.S.-brokered Armenia–Azerbaijan track, and a set of economic and defense cooperation announcements that Armenian officials presented as strategic rather than symbolic.

Armenian outlets reported that Vance arrived in Yerevan on February 9 accompanied by his wife, Usha Vance and with their children as well, and that he was received at Zvartnots by senior Armenian officials including National Assembly Speaker Alen Simonyan and other government figures. From there, the core of the visit centered on meetings with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, followed by joint statements for the media that emphasized “institutionalizing peace” and expanding the bilateral “strategic partnership.”

On February 10, Vance and his wife visited the Tsitsernakaberd Armenian Genocide Memorial complex, laid flowers at the eternal flame, and signed the Book of Honored Guests—an appearance covered prominently by Armenian press. Armenian reporting also noted heightened security around the memorial during the visit, underscoring how closely watched the optics were domestically.

The headline deliverable: civil nuclear cooperation and the “123 Agreement” track

The most consequential announcement was a bilateral statement indicating that Armenia and the United States had completed negotiations on what is widely referred to as a “123 Agreement”—the legal framework required for U.S. civil nuclear cooperation and licensing of nuclear technology exports. Reuters characterized this as a major step that could enable U.S. participation in Armenia’s plan to replace the aging Metsamor nuclear plant, with Vance publicly attaching large export figures to the prospective cooperation (reported as up to $5 billion initially, plus additional longer-term fuel and maintenance arrangements).

Why this matters in Armenian terms is straightforward: energy security is strategic, and Metsamor replacement planning has long been entangled with geopolitics. Reuters explicitly framed the move as part of Armenia’s effort to reduce dependence on Russian and Iranian energy links and as a potential blow to Moscow’s traditional role in the sector—an interpretation reinforced by Russian officials’ public pushback and promotion of Rosatom as an alternative.

That said, Armenian and regional reporting also highlighted ambiguity around some of the figures and framing used during the visit—particularly the scale and timing of the “export” numbers—suggesting that some of what was presented as a near-term “deal” is better understood as a negotiated framework and political commitment that still requires follow-through, project selection, and financing decisions.

Defense and technology: a drone sale framed as a precedent

A second major headline out of Yerevan was Vance’s announcement of a U.S. sale of drone and surveillance technology to Armenia, reported as worth $11 million and described as a significant milestone in U.S.–Armenia defense cooperation. The drone component is represented as a “first-ever major” U.S. military-technology sale to Armenia, pairing it with broader claims about advanced technology exports and investment intent.

For Armenian audiences, the significance is less about the dollar value than the precedent: it signals a willingness—at least at the level of public political messaging—to deepen practical defense ties at a time when Armenia has been diversifying suppliers and partnerships.

TRIPP and the peace/economics linkage: what the U.S. is trying to lock in

As of today, the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz are the focal point for both tactical maritime friction and strategic decision-making between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Between February 3rd and today, we’ve had two major incidents involving tankers in that region:

• Feb 3: Iran attempted to stop and board an American-flagged tanker using fast boats and a drone.

• Today: Iran seized two tankers near Farsi Island, north of the Strait of Hormuz.

That’s not business as usual. That’s escalation behavior—especially while they’re pretending to negotiate.

The ship they tried to stop on February 3rd wasn’t just “some American-flagged commercial vessel.” It was the MV Stena Impero—part of a U.S. government program called the Tanker Security Program (TSP).

TSP ships are essentially mobile fuel lifelines for the U.S. Navy—specially certified for refueling warships underway. That’s not a small capability. That is how you keep destroyers and carrier groups operating without coming home.

So when Iran sends fast boats with machine guns and launches a drone toward a tanker like that, it isn’t just piracy or harassment. It’s potentially an attempt to cripple U.S. naval sustainment right before a strike window.

And if Iran had successfully taken that tanker? That could’ve kicked off a shooting war on the spot.

The two ships seized today—and why Iran did it now

Now, the two tankers seized today near Farsi Island were different. These were illegally flagged “ghost fleet” style ships, and based on what’s being overlooked in mainstream reporting, they were involved in subsidy arbitrage—buying heavily subsidized Iranian diesel and selling it in neighboring markets for massive profit.

Iran subsidizes fuel so heavily that it can be purchased inside the country for pennies. Across the water, diesel sells at market rates. That markup is insane—more than most illegal drug operations.

So yes—Iran has every right to stop fuel theft.

But here’s the real question: Why do it now?

I’ve said for a couple years now that we’re living through something bigger than a single war in a single place. Call it a world war, call it a multi-front conflict, call it the beginning stages of a new global order collapsing and reforming—whatever label you prefer, the point is this:

What happens in one theater affects the others, and the people pretending these conflicts are isolated are either naïve or lying.

Northeast Syria: the quiet tension under the surface

Yesterday we pushed as far northeast as you can go inside Syria—close enough to see the tri-border area where Iraq, Iran, and Turkey squeeze together. We drove right along the Turkish border wall. We passed an American base that is still functional, and we watched a U.S. convoy roll by—MRAPs, American flags, escorting tankers and cargo trucks that looked like a resupply run.

So yes: there are still U.S. troops here, and they’re positioned where the oil infrastructure is. This matters, because it tells you what Washington is willing to hold onto even when it publicly pretends it’s “done” with Syria.

This whole region is still considered Kurdish-held territory. And even as Kurdish authorities try to manage the political reality of new forces pushing in—playing “friendly,” flashing peace signs, trying to keep the temperature down—the underlying truth hasn’t changed:

The Kurds haven’t abandoned the dream of a state.

There are still voices calling for Rojava—everything east of the Euphrates—to be declared sovereign. That probably isn’t going anywhere diplomatically, but it tells you the story here isn’t “resolved.” It’s paused. And pauses in this part of the world are usually just the breath you take before the next sprint.

Derek, displaced families, and the kind of “aid” that lasts longer than food

We also went to the town of Derek, in the far northeast corner—right on the Turkish border. Our Free Burma Rangers team was there to run a Good Life Club and do food distribution for internally displaced families living in a school.